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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------0-----DIANNA LYNN JORGENSON (OVARD)
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
-vs.-

Supreme Court No. 15434

JAMES SCOTT JORGENSON,
Defendant and
Respondent.

------0-----RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

------0-----NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action based upon mutual Petitions for
Modification filed by each party pursuant to a preceding
divorce action.

As pertinent to this appeal, appellant (roother)

sought the imposition of more restrictive child visitation
while respondent (father) sought a more definite statement of
his rights of visitation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon a full hearing of the lower court, the Petition
of appellant, as it pertains hereto, was denied while respondent's Petition, with modifications, was granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's
ruling in its entirety.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
That parties hereto were divorced in 1972.

The

Decree therein granting custody of the parties' minor child
to appellant with respondent being awarded reasonable rights
of visitation. (R. pg. 17).
Subsequent to the divorce of the parties, defendant
began to experience difficulty in exercising his visitation
(T. 107-110).

That difficulty resulted in defendant initia-

ting three seperate court proceedings in order to enforce
his visitation (R. 11, 24, 61-63).

At the first hearing,

the parties were ordered to avail themselves of counseling
in order to facilitate visitation (R. 19).

The second hear-

ing resulted from plaintiff's failure to comply with the
recommendations of the Court (R. 23).

At the second hearing,

the Court set forth temporary visitation with the direction
that the parties endeavor to increase the extent of the visitation by defendant (R. 26).

At the third hearing, again

as a result of plaintiff's denial of reasonable visitation,
the Court ordered extremely specific visitation to defendant
and, in light of plaintiff's past performance, made visitation an integral requirement of chi.ld support obligations .(R. 67-70
The courts have unanimously upheld the visitation rights of
the defendant and have, in fact, encouraged an increase of
visitation (T. 12).

This in spite of the fact that plaintiff

presented a Dr. Bernell Christensen at the third hearing who

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recommended that defendant be deprived of visitation for at
least six more years. (T. SO)
Plaintiff, since the parties divorce, has consistently frustrated the rights of the defendant, and has maintained an attitude contrary to the best interest of the child
(T. 13-15, T. 20, T. 22, T. 25, T. 27, T. 28, T. 29, T. 32,
T. 42, T. 89, T. 107-110, and T. 152).

Throughout the trial

of this matter, no evidence was ever produced to show defendant was other than a normal father (T. 59, 63, 124) and the
Court so found.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING VISITATION
OF THE MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT
It cannot be gainsaid that the best interest and
welfare of the minor child constitutes the primary concern
and guiding principle in the award of visitation of a child
caught in the turbulance of divorce.
The _legislature of this state has enunciated that
policy in §30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads:
" ... Visitation rights of parents,
grandparents and other relatives
shall take into consideration the
welfare of the child."
That doctrine has been followed by this Court in
its decisions.

See Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d

550 (1949); Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418
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(1956); Johnson ''. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16
(1958); Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P. 2d 884 (1969);
Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P. 2d 1019 (1974);
and Mecham v. Mecham, 544 P. 2d 479 (1975).
It is no less well settled that the trial court's
decision as to children will not be disturbed unless it is
clear that a breach of discretion occurred at the lower
level.

Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931

(1958); Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 2d 198, 389 P. 2d 1023
(1964).

The reason for the "infallibility" rule is that the

trial court is in an advantaged position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and form opinions.

As stated in

Sampsell supra, at 115 Utah 80:
"The trial judge had the opportunity, as we do not, of seeing
the parties and the witnesses,
of observing their demeanor,
and of forming opinions."
And in Hyde supra, the court reiterated that concept wherein it states at 454 P. 2d 885:
"The trial lasted several days, and
since both parties testified in open
court and were present during the
taking of the testimony of other witnesses, the trial judge was in a much
better position to determine the
question of fitness of the parties to
have custody than are we who are
limited to the reading of the record.
He had the advantage of observing the
behavior of the parties and could,
therefore, better judge the emotional
stability of each, than we can."

-4-
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In addition, appellant would apparently have matters of this nature determined by psychiatrists and not in
the traditional manner (T. 137A-139).

However, the Mecham

case, supra, at 544 P. 2d 481, appears to shed light on not
only the "infallibility" rule but on the roles of psychiatrists vis-a-vis the judiciary in making this type of determination.

In that matter, it was held:
"The court had the benefit of
testimony of psychiatrists,
who gave their expert opinions,
based on the appraisals they
were able to make of the parties, the minor child, and
the situation in which they
were involved. Their opinions are worthy of careful
consideration by the court,
but are advisory only, and in
no sense controlling. The
parties appeared and testified. The court had the opportunity to observe their appearance and demeanor and to
evaluate to a limited degree
their personalities, attitudes
and emotional stability, and
to make a judgment in reliance
on all the evidence produced
at the trial as to what appeared
to be in the best interest of
the minor child. The ultimate
decision was for the trial
judge, who was in a more favorable position than we are to
weigh the evidence as it came
from the mouths of the witnesses
before him, and to make a proper determination of the issues
presented.
It is abundantly clear from the record that the

trial court did carefully weigh and consider the testimony
-5-
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of plaintiff's expert (T. 147 and 152).

However, in his

position, he was able to weigh that testimony in relationship to the testimony of the parties and their demeanor.
Such consideration should not be disregarded without a substantial showing of abuse on the part of the trial court.
In making its order, the Court was obviously concerned about
the need for respondent to visit with the child and with
appellent's continually flaunting of the Court's previous
orders. (T. 22, 42, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153).

As a

result of that concern, the Court properly exercised its considerable equitable powers.

This court has affirmed the

trial court's powers in Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P. 2d 1010
(1974) at 1014:
" ... In matters concerning custody
and support of children, because
of their highly equitable nature,
it is appropriate for the trial
court to take into consideration
the entire circumstances in making any order of enforcement of
the decree, by contempt or otherwise, having in mind equitable
powers, to make any adjustment
he may think fair and justified."
The Court was concerned that, because of the history of this matter, its method of enforcement was proper.
(T.

and 150).

Such an order is not without precedence.

In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P. 2d 821 (1974), the trlal
court suspended support payments for lack of visitation.
In affirming that order, the court said at 822:

-6-
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"That requirement was a condition precedent to obtaining
support money, i.e. - the exercise of Mr. Peterson's right to
see his children. Mrs. Peterson
had not permitted this, which
became the basis for her contempt.
In short, she had not done and in
not doing equity the while she
insists on it, by now seeking,
without any displayed penitence,
remorse or strings attached, to
invoke the very jurisdiction of
the same court that she flouted
before."
The facts herein are so similar as to obviate the
further need for comparison.

When the Court is convinced,

as it is here, that customary methods of enforcement are useless, it may impose its considerable discretion to impose a
method of enforcement that will ensure compliance.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has intentionally and consistently disregarded the orders of the court allowing defendant child
visitation.

Plaintiff has additionally failed at every step

of these proceedings to show that defendant is anything but
a normal father in a similar situation.
the Court has

At each proceeding

determined that defendant is entitled to visi-

tation and the hearing precipitating this appeal is no exception.

The Court, in attempting to deal with a difficult

situation has exercised its equitable powers in order to
enforce its decision as it relates to the best interest and
welfare of the child, that is, the fostering of a father-son
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